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INTRODUCTION
Scholars and advocates often borrow from foreign law to make rights
claims on behalf of sexual orientation and gender identity (“SOGI”) minori-
ties in the United States.1  They tend to rely, however, almost exclusively on
†Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University; Harvey S. Shipley Miller Teaching
Fellow (2006-2007), UCLA School of Law; Visiting Fellow (Spring 2007), University of
Hong Kong Centre for Comparative & Public Law.  This Article benefited from generous
research funding from the Williams Institute on Sexual Orientation Law & Public Policy
at the UCLA School of Law.  I am grateful for having had the opportunity to present
a version of this Article at the Williams Institute’s Works-in-Progress Series.  I thank
Liz Glazer, Karen Kong, Seung-hyun Lee, Kelley Loper, Dean Spade, Sam Winter, and
Hyunah Yang for helpful conversations on this Article.  For invaluable research assis-
tance and substantive suggestions, I thank Orly Rachmilovitz, Frank Salamone, Michael
Weinstein, and Jen Wilson.  Of course, all shortcomings remain my own.
1 Two comments on terminology: First, I use the terms “SOGI minorities” and
“SOGI rights” instead of “LGBT” and “LGBT rights” because I believe the former
terms are more inclusive.  Some sexual orientation and gender identity minorities—often
those from foreign countries—do not identify with the LGBT label because it is so cul-
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legal developments in Western countries.2  In this Article, I introduce two
recent cases from East Asia that warrant attention from human rights schol-
ars, advocates, and lawmakers around the world—particularly in the United
States.3
Two landmark decisions on law and sexuality in 2006 came from Asian
jurisdictions: Hong Kong and South Korea.  In Leung v. Secretary of Justice,
the Hong Kong Court of Appeal held that disparate age-of-consent laws re-
garding vaginal and anal intercourse violated Hong Kong’s Basic Law and
Bill of Rights.4  The unanimous three-judge panel set new precedent by rec-
ognizing sexual orientation as a proscribed ground of discrimination, giving
sexual orientation equal footing with other proscribed grounds of discrimina-
tion, such as sex and race.5  In the case of In re Change of Name and Cor-
turally loaded. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.  Second, the terms “interna-
tional” and “foreign” should not be conflated.  “International” legal developments occur
at the level of international institutions, such as the United Nations, and “foreign” legal
developments occur within regional, national, or local institutions.
2 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR
BETTER OR FOR WORSE?: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE (2006) (supporting
same-sex marriage in the United States by discussing developments in Northern Europe);
Grace Ganz Blumberg, Legal Recognition of Same-sex Conjugal Relationships: The 2003
California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil Rights
and Family Law Perspective, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1555 (2004) (using a study of Canadian
law to argue for capacious legal recognition of same-sex partnerships); Laura Grenfell,
Embracing Law’s Categories: Anti-Discrimination Laws and Transgenderism, 15 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 51 (2003) (comparing Canada, Europe, and the United States, and sug-
gesting that the United States adopt Canada’s protections against discrimination based on
gender identity).
3 I address the two cases within one article, even though one focuses on sexual orien-
tation and the other on gender identity, because many advocates and commentators, my-
self included, consider sexual orientation and gender identity to be interrelated. See, e.g.,
Shannon Minter, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights? Getting Real about Transgender
Inclusion in the Gay Rights Movement, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 589, 592 (2000)
(“[H]omophobia and transphobia are tightly intertwined, and . . . anti-gay bias so often
takes the form of violence and discrimination against those who are seen as transgressing
gender norms.”).
4 Leung T.C. William Roy v. Secretary of Justice, [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211(C.A.)
[hereinafter Leung II], aff’g [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 657 (C.F.I) [hereinafter Leung I].
5 Leung II ¶ 53 (“Where there is an apparent breach of rights based on race, sex or
sexual orientation, the court will scrutinise with intensity.”).  The government of Hong
Kong conceded, during lower court proceedings, that sexual orientation constitutes a pro-
tected status under Hong Kong’s Basic Law and Bill of Rights; the courts accepted that
concession in their decisions. See also Leung I ¶ 43–46; Leung II ¶ 46.
As this work was being finalized for publication, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal
confirmed that sexual orientation is a classification analogous to race and sex. See Secre-
tary for Justice v. Yau & Lee, FACC 12/2006 (July 17, 2007) (C.F.A.) (“Where one is
concerned with differential treatment based on race, sex or sexual orientation, the court
will scrutinize with intensity whether the difference in treatment is justified.”).  In Yau &
Lee, two men were charged with violating Crimes Ordinance section 118(F)(1), which
criminalized same-sex anal sex occurring “otherwise than in public,” because they had
sex in a parked car. See Yau & Lee, FACC 12/2006, ¶ 4.  The court held that section
118(F)(1) contravened Hong Kong’s Basic Law and Bill of Rights by treating differently
same-sex and opposite-sex sexual conduct. See Yau & Lee, FACC 12/2006, ¶ 3–7, 90.
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rection of Family Register (“Family Register”),6 the Supreme Court of South
Korea held that the country’s statutory scheme, in conjunction with the coun-
try’s constitution, requires the government to legally recognize certain trans-
gender7 persons for their current sex.  In reaching its holding, the majority
stated that “a transsexual has the right to enjoy the dignity and value of a
human being, to seek happiness and to lead a humane life.”8
This Article shows how these two cases should color one’s view of
American law.  At the outset, I should note that this piece is agnostic on the
highly contested question of whether American courts should cite foreign
law.9  It proceeds with the assumption that foreign legal developments can
and should prompt critical self-reflection in the United States—if not in
6 In re Change of Name and Correction of Family Register, 2004 Seu 42 (S. Kor.,
June 22, 2006); available at http://library.scourt.go.kr/jsp/html/decision/2_67.2004seu42.
htm.  This Article is based on the South Korean Supreme Court’s English translation of
the Korean-language decision, available online at http://www.scourt.go.kr/scourt_en/crt_
dcsns/crt_dcsns1/index.html.  For confirmation purposes, an independent translation by
Kristy Kim (M.A., Monterey Institute of International Studies) is on file at the Williams
Institute on Sexual Orientation Law & Public Policy.  The Korean-language version of the
decision is available online at http://www.scourt.go.kr/news/NewsListAction.work?
gubun=2.
Following Dean Spade, I use the term “current” sex, as opposed to “chosen” sex,
which is also used in the legal literature.  I opt for the former term because it is neutral on
the question of whether transgender persons actually choose to be transgender. See Dean
Spade, Consolidating the Gendered Citizen: Gender Reclassification Policies and the War
on Terror (forthcoming) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
7 This Article uses the term “transgender” as an umbrella term referring to all per-
sons who do not identify with the gender assigned to them at birth.  It uses the term
“transsexual” to refer to all persons who identify with the term or are labeled as such by
a court opinion; the term is commonly used to describe transgender persons who have
undergone, or wish to undergo, medical procedures related to their gender identity.  In
Family Register, the Korean government used the term “transsexual” throughout its
translation of the Supreme Court opinion.  Note, however, that Korean language does not
distinguish between “sex” and “gender”; instead, it refers to both as “ .”  A Korean
transliteration of the word “gender” ( ) is, however, increasingly used in academic
circles.  Interview with Hyunah Yang, Professor, Seoul National University College of
Law, in Atlanta, Ga. (Sept. 7, 2007); email from Hyunah Yang (Nov. 22, 2007) (on file
with author).
8 Family Register, 2004 Seu 42 § 2.B.1.
9 For a sample of the copious literature on this debate, see Roger P. Alford, The
United States Constitution and International Law: Misusing International Sources to In-
terpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (2004); Taavi Annus, Comparative Consti-
tutional Reasoning: The Law and Strategy of Selecting the Right Arguments, 14 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 301 (2003); Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification:
Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Per-
spective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2003); Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV.
109 (2005); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 131 (2006); Vincent J. Samar, Justifying the Use of International Human Rights
Principles in American Constitutional Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 1 (2005); Jer-
emy Waldron, Foreign Law and Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129 (2005);
Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug.
2004, at 41.
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courts of law, then in legislatures, law reviews, and legal discourse more
generally.10
Accepting that foreign legal developments can be helpful, which for-
eign jurisdictions are worth considering?  Hong Kong and South Korea are
especially noteworthy because they fare well under two measures of persua-
siveness.  First, Hong Kong and South Korea are persuasive because they are
the United States’ peers, in that they are committed to human rights, the rule
of law, and democracy or democratization.11  Second, Hong Kong and South
Korea are persuasive because they are not Western jurisdictions; foreign ju-
risdictions with cultural backdrops different from the United States’ help to
illuminate potentially flawed cultural biases in American law.12  Jurisdictions
such as Hong Kong and South Korea—those that are at once ideologically
similar and culturally different—are uniquely useful for comparative
purposes.13
The Hong Kong and South Korean cases should prompt critical discus-
sions at two levels.  At the macro level, both cases contribute to a broad
normative critique of American law.  Among the United States’ peer juris-
dictions, there is a strengthening norm of support for SOGI rights—a norm
from which the United States deviates in some regards.  At the micro level,
the Hong Kong and South Korean cases offer insight on a variety of specific
issues, ranging from the practicality of the United States’ tiered equal protec-
tion analyses to empirical claims regarding the feasibility of altering a per-
sons’ legally recognized sex.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I provides
background on SOGI rights in international and foreign law and their impli-
cations for SOGI rights in the United States.  Parts II and III discuss the
insights that American comparativists can draw from the Hong Kong and
South Korean cases, respectively.
I. LAW AND SEXUALITY BEYOND AMERICAN BORDERS
Around the world, there is a growing chorus of claims for the right to
sexual liberty and the right to live free from discrimination on the basis of
one’s sexual orientation and gender identity.  Those claims have produced an
10 In writing on what he calls the “transnational legal process,” Harold Hongju Koh
has argued that judicial interpretation is only one channel though which international
developments are domesticated.  Executive, legislative, academic and other nongovern-
mental players all participate in a dialogic process that internalizes international legal
developments. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35
HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law
Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of
Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
11 See infra notes 46 & 50 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 50 & 51 and accompanying text.
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increasing number of legal protections for SOGI minorities.  This Part pro-
vides background on mobilization around the world for SOGI rights, the
legal protections resulting from that mobilization, and how developments
abroad can inspire legal development in the United States.
A. Mobilization & Legal Protections Attained
Although scholars have documented a long-existing diversity in sexual
orientation and gender identity that spans across borders and cultures, mobil-
ization for SOGI rights is often traced back to the United States.14  The
American SOGI rights movement, galvanized by the historic Stonewall Ri-
ots, has inspired similar rights movements around the world that have
adopted American strategies—even the now-ubiquitous Pride parades.15  In-
deed, some scholars have called the global SOGI rights movement an Amer-
ican “export.”16
The American roots of foreign SOGI rights movements have sometimes
been a liability.  In some countries, SOGI rights advocates have been frus-
trated by their governments, which have mischaracterized American influ-
ences, asserting that SOGI rights, and even homosexuality, are products of
American culture, and thus incompatible with local culture.17
In response, SOGI rights scholars and advocates in other countries—
especially non-Western countries—are modifying the American SOGI rights
movement and making it their own.  Carl Stychin, a leading British scholar
of law and sexuality, has remarked that SOGI advocates “have become able
14 On how sexual orientation and gender identity diversity transcend both time and
cultural-geographical borders, see, for example, LOUIS CROMPTON, HOMOSEXUALITY &
CIVILIZATION (2003) (discussing diversity of sexual orientation); SERENA NANDA, GENDER
DIVERSITY: CROSSCULTURAL VARIATIONS (1999) (discussing diversity of gender identity).
On tracing SOGI rights movements back to the United States, see Douglas Sanders, Get-
ting Lesbian and Gay Issues on the International Human Rights Agenda, 18 HUM. RTS.
Q. 67, 77 (1996) (tracing “the international ‘gay liberation’ movement” back to the 1969
Stonewall Riots in New York).
15 During the Stonewall Riots of 1969, patrons of the Stonewall Inn, a bar frequented
by SOGI minorities, resisted a police raid.  For background on the Stonewall Riots and
their role in galvanizing the American SOGI rights movement, see generally JOHN
D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MI-
NORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940–1970 232–39 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2d ed. 1998).
For discussions on the role that the American SOGI rights movement played in shaping
similar movements in other countries, see Hassan El Menyawi, Activism from the Closet:
Gay Rights Strategising in Egypt, 7 MELB. J. INT’L L. 28 (2006); Sonia Katyal, Exporting
Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 98–101, 115 (2002); Sanders, supra note 14, at 77;
Carl F. Stychin, Same-Sex Sexualities and the Globalization of Human Rights Discourse,
49 MCGILL L.J. 951, 954 (2004).
16 See, e.g., El Menyawi, supra note 15, at 30; Stychin, supra note 15, at 954.
17 See El Menyawi, supra note 15, at 41–42 (discussing the Egyptian government’s
assertion that sexual orientation rights and homosexuality are American and incompatible
with local culture); Katyal, supra note 15, at 123–25 (discussing similar dynamics in
Zimbabwe).
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to move seamlessly between discourses of the local and the global.”18  For
example, while SOGI advocates in non-Western countries invoke cosmopol-
itan human rights, they simultaneously point out that same-sex attraction and
diverse gender identity are indigenous to local culture, predating regula-
tions—such as anti-sodomy laws—which were introduced, in many cases,
by Western colonists.19  Advocates have also adopted terminology and clas-
sification schemes that better reflect local understandings of sexuality.  For
example, in Nepal, where conceptions of sexual identity are much more
nuanced than they are in the United States, the leading SOGI rights group
describes itself as advocating on behalf of “sexual minorities including
Meta, Dohori, Ta, Gay, Bisexual, Lesbian, Hijra, Singaru, Fulumulu, Kothi,
Kotha, Strian, Maugia, Panthi and many more.”20
The global movement for SOGI rights has attained significant suc-
cesses, which this Article cannot comprehensively list.  At the international
level, numerous UN treaty bodies have interpreted their respective human
rights treaties to protect sexual autonomy and proscribe sexual orientation
discrimination.  Although the treaty bodies’ interpretations are not binding,
many nations view them as highly persuasive.21  In the 1994 landmark case
of Toonen v. Australia, the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) stated that
Tasmania’s criminalization of sodomy violated privacy rights enshrined in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).22  In
Toonen, the HRC also stated that the ICCPR proscribes sexual orientation
18 Stychin, supra note 15, at 951. See also id. at 958–60 (describing strategies that
SOGI rights advocates use to move between local and cosmopolitan discourses).
19 See id. at 958.  For a relevant case study, see Marc McLelland, Interview with
Samshasha, Hong Kong’s First Gay Rights Activist and Author, 4 INTERSECTIONS: GEN-
DER, HIST. & CULTURE IN THE ASIAN CONTEXT (2004), available at http://wwwsshe.
murdoch.edu.au/intersections/issue4/interview_mclelland.html (discussing the use of his-
torical evidence to counter the argument that homosexuality is foreign to Chinese
culture).
20 Blue Diamond Society, Our Mission, http://www.bds.org.np/mission.php (last vis-
ited Nov. 8, 2007).  The Nepalese terms of self-identification are more descriptive than
the English terms “lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender,” in that one Nepalese term
can simultaneously convey the sex of one’s sexual partners, whether he prefers the inser-
tive or receptive role in sexual intercourse, and/or whether he otherwise conforms to
mainstream gender expectations.  For detailed explication of some Nepalese terms of sex-
ual identity, see PAUL BOYCE & SUNIL PANT, FAMILY HEALTH INT’L, RAPID ETHNOGRAPHY
OF MALE TO MALE SEXUALITY AND SEXUAL HEALTH (2001), available at http://www.fhi.
org/en/HIVAIDS/pub/survreports/msmnepal.htm.
21 See Johanna E. Bond, International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic
Exploration of Women’s International Human Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71, 87
n.56 (2003) (describing United Nations Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) opinions as
“highly persuasive”); Martin S. Flaherty, Rights, Reality, and Utopia, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1789, 1801 (2004) (describing the HRC as having “significant persuasive influence
on states”); Eric Heinze, Sexual Orientation and International Law: A Study in the Man-
ufacture of Cross-Cultural “Sensitivity”, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 283, 293 (2001) (describing
the HRC’s views as “highly persuasive”).
22 Toonen v. Australia, Human Rights Comm., Comm. No. 488/1992, ¶¶ 8–9, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) (discussing the violation of privacy rights enshrined
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art.
17 juncto art. 2, U.N. Doc 14668 (Dec. 16, 1966)).
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discrimination.23  Although the ICCPR does not explicitly refer to sexual
orientation, the HRC stated that the treaty’s explicit proscription of sex dis-
crimination subsumes proscription of sexual orientation discrimination.24  In
two subsequent cases, the HRC reiterated that the ICCPR proscribes sexual
orientation discrimination, finding that states violated equality protections
when they treated unmarried opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples dif-
ferently for the purposes of government pensions.25
Since Toonen, other UN human rights treaty bodies have interpreted
their respective treaties to protect sexual orientation minorities.26  For exam-
ple, the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has stated
that the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
specifically protects against sexual orientation discrimination in areas such
as the labor market and access to healthcare.27  Similarly, the UN Committee
on the Rights of the Child has stated that the Convention on the Rights of the
Child specifically proscribes sexual orientation discrimination targeted at
youth.28
Outside of the UN, regional, national, and local jurisdictions have taken
legal steps to protect SOGI minorities.  In Europe, for example, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has issued decisions protecting the rights of
individuals to serve in the armed forces regardless of sexual orientation,29 the
23 Toonen, U.N.Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 ¶ 8.7 (discussing the right to nondis-
crimination enshrined in article 26 of the ICCPR).
24 Id.  For theoretical support for the relationship between sex discrimination and sex-
ual orientation discrimination, see, for example, Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimina-
tion Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197
(1994).
25 X v. Colombia, Human Rights Comm., Comm. No. 1361/2005, ¶ 3.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005 (2007) (“[T]he Committee finds that the State party has vio-
lated article 26 of the Covenant by denying the author’s right to his life partner’s pension
on the basis of his sexual orientation.”); Young v. Australia, Human Rights Comm.,
Comm. No. 941/2000, ¶ 10.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (2003) (“The Commit-
tee recalls its earlier jurisprudence that the prohibition against discrimination under arti-
cle 26 comprises also discrimination based on sexual orientation. . . .  The Committee
finds that the State party has violated article 26 of the Covenant by denying the author a
pension on the basis of his sex or sexual orientation.”).
26 See generally Ignacio Saiz, Bracketing Sexuality: Human Rights and Sexual Orien-
tation—A Decade of Development and Denial at the UN, 7 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 49
(2004).
27 See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, The Right to Work:
General Comment No. 18, ¶ 12(b)(1), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 2006) (discuss-
ing the right to nondiscrimination in art. 2); U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural
Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 14, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.
12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
28 See, e.g., Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: (Isle of Man) United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.134 (Oct. 16, 2000) (stating that dispa-
rate age-of-consent laws violated the Convention on the Rights of the Child’s protection
of equality in article 2).
29 See Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548 (2000).
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right of biological parents to nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation during custody disputes,30 the right to equal treatment between unmar-
ried same-sex and opposite-sex couples,31 and the rights of certain
transgender individuals to be recognized for their current sex.32  In addition,
the European Union now requires its member states to prohibit discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation in employment contexts.33
Although Europe has been at the forefront of protecting SOGI rights, it
is not alone.  While it is outside the scope of this Article to catalogue a
comprehensive list of SOGI rights worldwide, the following are some exam-
ples for illustrative purposes.  Canada and South Africa both protect the right
of same-sex couples to marry.34  Jurisdictions within Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico allow same-sex couples to register for legal recognition and attain
various marriage-like rights.35  The constitutions of Ecuador, Fiji, and South
Africa explicitly prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.36  Places ranging
from Mexico and Israel to New Zealand and New South Wales all prohibit
sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace,37  while countries ranging
from Japan and Singapore to the United Kingdom have enacted legislation to
legally recognize transgender persons’ current sex.38
30 See Mouta v. Portugal, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1055 (2001).
31 See Karner v. Austria, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528 (2003) (holding that unmarried same-
sex couples had the same tenancy succession rights as unmarried opposite-sex couples).
32 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 (2002); I v. United King-
dom, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 967 (2003).
33 See generally Travis J. Langenkamp, Comment, Finding Fundamental Fairness:
Protecting the Rights of Homosexuals under European Union Accession Law, 4 SAN DI-
EGO J. INT’L L. 437 (2003).
34 See generally Paula Ettelbrick, A Global License to Marry, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6,
2006, at A21 (summarizing recent developments abroad in the legal recognition of same-
sex partnerships).  One should note that the HRC has held that the ICCPR does not re-
quire state parties to legally recognize same-sex marriages. See Joslin v. New Zealand,
Human Rights Comm., Comm. No. 902/1999, ¶ 8.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999
(2002); see also Quilter v. Attorney-General, [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523 (C.A.) (upholding
the New Zealand Marriage Act’s exclusion of same-sex couples).  In Joslin, however, two
members of the HRC opined that, if state parties restrict marriage to same-sex couples,
they must extend marriage-like rights and benefits to same-sex couples under a separate
regime. See Joslin at Appendix (Lallah & Scheinin, concurring).
35 See Ettelbrick, supra note 34.
36 See Douglas Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientation in International Law,
25 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 13, 35–6 (2002) (discussing constitutional reform in South Af-
rica, Fiji, and Ecuador).
37 See Ley Federal para Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminacion [L.R.P.E.D] [Federal
Law to Prevent and Eliminate Discrimination], art. 4, Diario Oficial de la Federación
(D.O.), 11 de junio 2006 (Mex.); Israel Equal Opportunities in Labor Act, 5748–1988, 42
LSI 31 (1987–88) (Isr.); New Zealand Human Rights Act 2003, 2003 S.N.Z. No. 82;
New South Wales (Australia) Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977 amended 1982, Part 4C.
38 The prerequisites for recognition vary by jurisdiction.  For background on recogni-
tion in each of these jurisdictions, and others, see Robyn Emerton, Time for Change: A
Call for the Legal Recognition of Transsexual and Other Transgender Persons in Hong
Kong, 34 HONG KONG L.J. 515, 545–55 (2004).
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B. Implications for the United States
Indeed, in many parts of the world, there are growing legal protections
for SOGI rights.  What should the United States make of these develop-
ments?  Just as SOGI rights movements abroad were inspired by the Ameri-
can Stonewall experience, Americans can be inspired by legal developments
abroad.  None of the developments discussed above are binding sources of
law for the United States, but they should prompt Americans to rethink their
positions on SOGI issues.39  The remainder of the section will explore the
following questions: (1) Which foreign jurisdictions are persuasive?  (2)
What could the United States learn from looking abroad?
i. Persuasive jurisdictions
Before proceeding further, one should note that, despite the develop-
ments recounted above, many jurisdictions around the world still do not pro-
tect SOGI minorities from discrimination; some even actively discriminate
against and torture individuals on the bases of sexual orientation and gender
identity.40  The United States is more protective of SOGI rights than many
other countries,41 and many SOGI minorities seek asylum in the United
States to escape persecution in their native lands.42  Since there are foreign
jurisdictions that are both less and more protective of SOGI rights than the
United States, an important threshold question arises: Which foreign juris-
dictions should the United States consider persuasive?
This question regarding jurisdictions’ relative persuasiveness has gar-
nered much attention.  At one extreme, commentators such as Chief Justice
39 The introduction argued that a variety of actors should engage in comparative legal
analyses, not just members of the judiciary. See supra note 10.  It is worth noting, how-
ever, that the American judiciary has, in fact, a history of consulting foreign laws. See
Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Deci-
sion, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of foreign
law); infra note 204 (collecting American court opinions that have cited foreign law on
transgender rights).
40 See, e.g., El Menyawi, supra note 15 (discussing sexual orientation persecution in
Egypt); Katyal, supra note 15, at 123–25 (discussing sexual orientation persecution in
Zimbabwe).
41 Moreover, within the United States, some states are much more respecting of
SOGI rights than others.  For example, contrast California (which has a SOGI antidis-
crimination law, a SOGI hate crime law, and a domestic partnership law that offers regis-
tered same-sex couples all of the state-level rights enjoyed by married couples) with
Alabama (which has no SOGI antidiscrimination law, no SOGI hate crime law, and no
legal recognition of same-sex couples).  For a state-by-state summary of laws, see gener-
ally Human Rights Campaign, HRC in Your Community, http://www.hrc.org/your_
community/index.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2007).
42 For background on SOGI asylum claims, see Immigration Equality, Asylum Law
Basics—Brief History of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and HIV (LGBT/H Asy-
lum) Law, LGBT/HIV ASYLUM MANUAL (2006), http://immigrationequality.org/manual_
template.php?id=1064#D_1.
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John Roberts have suggested that there is no way to distinguish among for-
eign jurisdictions, and thus citing foreign law is an arbitrary practice.43
Under such logic, those who favor expanding American protection of SOGI
rights will invoke foreign jurisdictions that are more protective of SOGI
rights and those who favor the status quo will look elsewhere, and neither
side is more justified in turning to its respective foreign sources.
Other commentators, however, have eschewed this belief that foreign
jurisdictions are indistinguishable.44 Although the literature on how to select
persuasive jurisdictions is still nascent, two factors affecting persuasiveness
are recurring.45  While these two factors seem to stand in opposition, they
can actually be complementary.
First, numerous commentators have argued that peer status is a measure
of persuasiveness.  That is to say, other jurisdictions that share the United
States’ commitment to human rights, rule of law, and democracy should have
persuasive value.46  Because they share the United States’ goals, such peers
might provide useful insights on how to realize those goals.  Put simply, this
first measure of persuasiveness is a measure of ideological sameness.47
Second, some commentators have suggested that cross-cultural conver-
gence on a particular position regarding human rights means that the posi-
tion is not merely a peculiar product of cultural biases, but is instead likely
to be an appropriate understanding of universal human rights; meanwhile,
deviation from that position might be motivated by cultural biases.48  In
43 During his Senate confirmation hearings, Chief Justice John Roberts criticized the
consideration of foreign law, stating that “looking at foreign law for support is like look-
ing out over a crowd and picking out your friends.” See Mark Tushnet, When is Knowing
Less Better than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court Refer-
ence to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1275 (2006) (quoting Chief Justice Rob-
erts).  This reasoning suggests that all foreign laws are equally persuasive and, therefore,
the process of selecting which foreign law to cite is arbitrary.
44 See infra notes 46–48.
45 Cf. Tushnet, supra note 43, at 1282 n.22 (supporting comparative analysis, but
noting that “more work needs to be done” by commentators on the question of how to
evaluate persuasiveness of foreign jurisdictions).
46 See, e.g., id. (“[R]eferences to the law of nations that can fairly be described as
reasonably well-functioning democracies are more appropriate than references to the law
of other nations.”); Rex D. Glensy, Quasi-Global Social Norms, 38 CONN. L. REV. 79,
107 (2005) (“[T]he sources of persuasive authority on which U.S. courts will rely will
not come from all nations, nor should they. . . .  [T]his country need only concern itself
with societies [that] are based on a fundamental respect for human rights.”); Jackson,
supra note 9, at 125 (“[P]ractices of countries with commitments to human rights, de-
mocracy, and the rule of law roughly comparable to ours are likely to have more positive
persuasive value . . . .”).
47 Although he does not focus on ideological commitments to human rights, rule of
law, and democracy, Youngjae Lee has written insightfully on the relevance of sameness
in comparative legal analyses. See Youngjae Lee, International Consensus as Persuasive
Authority in the Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 138 (2007) (“We all have
experiences of consulting members of various groups we belong to in order to test our
intuitions about one matter or another . . . .  [I]t explains why the mere existence of
consensus [among peers] can sometimes powerfully guide one’s moral deliberation”).
48 See id. at 139–40 (summarizing existing literature on cross-cultural convergence as
an indication of bias having been eliminated); Posner & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 153
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other words, foreign jurisdictions are particularly persuasive if, together,
they reach cross-cultural convergence on an understanding of rights.49  This
second measure of persuasiveness is a measure of difference: a rights norm
is more persuasive if it is shared by jurisdictions of differing cultural
backgrounds.
These two factors seem to stand in opposition—one grounded in same-
ness, the other in difference.  They can, however, work together.  There are
cultural differences among the United States’ ideological peers.  Accord-
ingly, while peer jurisdictions are persuasive on their own, they are even
more persuasive if, taken together, they demonstrate a cross-cultural position
on rights.
In light of this dynamic, the recent Hong Kong and South Korean cases
are noteworthy.  Hong Kong and South Korea are the United States’ peers, in
that they share a commitment to human rights, the rule of law, and democ-
racy or democratization.50  Although it is difficult to articulate the requisite
(“As long as the societies allow free debate, the very fact that very different societies
come to the same conclusions increases one’s confidence that the norms are genuinely
universal and transcend merely historical or institutional differences.”).  The philosophy
of John Rawls further supports the notion that norms of justice should be stripped of
cultural biases.  The purpose of Rawls’ “veil of ignorance” is to eliminate biases from the
process through which principles of justice are determined. See generally John Rawls, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
49 Notably, in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court invoked cross-cultural norms to
“confirm” its holding that the juvenile death penalty was unconstitutional.  543 U.S. 551,
577–78 (2005).  While this Article emphasizes the particular persuasiveness of cross-
cultural convergence among the United States’ peers, the Roper majority found conver-
gence among foreign jurisdictions more generally.
50 The United States Department of State has recognized both Hong Kong and South
Korea for their commitments to human rights and rule of law. See, e.g., BUREAU OF EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S.-HONG KONG POLICY ACT REPORT
(2005), http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/44543.htm (“Hong Kong residents enjoy
strong respect for the rule of law and civil liberties. . . .  Freedoms of speech, press,
religion, assembly, association, and other basic human rights remained respected and
defended in Hong Kong.”) [hereinafter U.S.-HONG KONG REPORT]; Interview by Jim
Jung, KBS News with Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, in Seoul, South Korea,
(Oct. 20, 2006) (transcript available at 2006 WLNR 18231514) (quoting Rice calling
South Korea “a vibrant democracy where critical voices are heard” and praising South
Korea for the fact that “the South Korean people enjoy freedoms and prosperity”) [here-
inafter KBS News]; Media Note, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S.-South Korea Relationship En-
ters New Era, State Says, (Jan. 20, 2006), http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2006/Jan/
20-573902.html (reporting that the United States and South Korea signed a joint state-
ment that acknowledged the two countries’ “common values rooted in shared respect for
democracy, human rights and the rule of law”). See generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2006 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/.  Meanwhile, Hong Kong is
only in the process of democratization (i.e., only half of Hong Kong’s legislature is popu-
larly elected and its Chief Executive is elected by a small group of electors).  Hong
Kong’s Basic Law requires, and the majority of Hong Kong citizens support, democrati-
zation; however, democratization has been slow in large part because of Beijing’s efforts
to stave off democratization in Hong Kong.  For background on Hong Kong’s democrati-
zation and Hong Kong-Beijing relations, see Michael C. Davis, The Basic Law and De-
mocratization in Hong Kong, 3 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 165 (2006). See also Keith
Bradsher, Hong Kong Leader Wins Re-election by an Expected Wide Margin, N.Y. TIMES,
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degree of commitment to the United States’ ideological goals for peer status,
the United States government has itself suggested that Hong Kong and South
Korea satisfy peer status.51  While Hong Kong and South Korea are the
United States’ peers, they are also Asian jurisdictions.52  As such, they pro-
vide evidence of growing cross-cultural convergence among peers on ques-
tions of SOGI rights.  This convergence is often overlooked by American
scholars because, as noted above, American comparativist literature on the
growth of SOGI rights has heretofore maintained a Eurocentric focus.53
ii. Insights from abroad
Comparative studies of law and sexuality prompt useful self-reflection
at two levels.54  First, developments in the United States’ peer jurisdictions
offer normative critiques of American law concerning broad topics, such as
SOGI discrimination generally.  The United States should not blindly follow
norms that emerge among its peers; however, if the United States falls out of
line with its peers, that deviation should be cause for critical questioning.  As
suggested above, divergence from a cross-cultural norm should be a particu-
larly strong impetus for self-reflection.  When the United States deviates
from its peers, Americans should question whether there is a legitimate rea-
son for the deviation, or whether the deviation is motivated by unjustified
biases, which might be entrenched in ossified legal reasoning.  This sort of
self-reflection is often referred to as the “dialogical” approach to compara-
tive law.55
Mar. 25, 2007, at A1 (discussing Hong Kong’s democratization and noting that sixty
percent of the Hong Kong public desires further democratization).  Even though Hong
Kong is not a full democracy, I consider it to be the United States’ peer because the
United States Department of State considers Hong Kong a peer. See, e.g., U.S.-HONG
KONG REPORT (“Hong Kong people share many values and interests with Americans and
have worked to make Hong Kong a model of what can be achieved in a society based on
rule of law and respect for civil liberties.  Hong Kong remains an open and largely toler-
ant society.”).
51 See supra note 50.
52 Despite its history as a British colony, Hong Kong maintained a distinctively Asian
culture. See Wong Siu-lum, Modernization and Chinese Culture in Hong Kong, 106
CHINA Q. 306, 325 (1986) (noting that, even though Hong Kong modernized under Brit-
ish rule, it “modern[ized] with distinctive Chinese characteristics”).
53 For a sample of this literature, see sources cited supra note 2.
54 Recall that this Article remains agnostic as to whether courts should directly cite
international and foreign law.  This Article assumes that, at the very least, comparative
analyses can influence broad discourse on American law, outside of traditional court-
houses and inside the larger courts of public and scholarly opinion. See supra notes 9-10
and accompanying text.
55 Of course, self-reflection may very well lead the United States to affirm its diver-
gent normative position.  Discussing dialogical comparative law specifically in constitu-
tional interpretation, Sujit Choudhry wrote in his seminal article:
[T]he study of comparative law ‘encourages the student to be more critical about
the functions and purposes of the rules he is studying and to learn not to accept
their validity purely because they belong to his own system of law.’ . . .
[C]omparative jurisprudence can be an important stimulus to legal self-reflection.
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Second, comparative studies shed light on more specific questions.  For
example, comparative analysis can help Americans understand the strengths
and weaknesses of particular legal tests.56  Over time, legal tests may or may
not prove to be useful in their administrative feasibility, predictive value,
ability to foster policy goals, etc.  For example, over time, the United States’
tier-based legal tests for equal protection claims have drawn criticism from
judges and legal commentators.57  Looking abroad for inspiration—to Hong
Kong, for example—may provide American jurists with ideas on how to
improve the United States’ judge-created legal tests for equal protection
claims.
Similarly, comparative analyses can provide empirical evidence regard-
ing specific factual questions.  For example, in the case of Washington v.
Glucksberg, the Supreme Court looked to Dutch experience for empirical
evidence regarding the implications of decriminalizing euthanasia.58  In the
realm of law and sexuality, American scholars have already looked to the
European experience in recognizing same-sex partnerships, to refute the
claim by American opponents of same-sex marriage that legal recognition of
same-sex partnerships will have undesirable consequences on opposite-sex
marriage and birth rates.59  The South Korean experience with sex-change
recognition may eventually provide empirical data to support (or undermine)
claims about the administrative feasibility of sex-change recognition.
The mode of comparative constitutional interpretation that these scholars point to
is ‘dialogical,’ because courts that take this interpretive approach engage in a dia-
logue with comparative jurisprudence in order to better understand their own con-
stitutional systems and jurisprudence.
Choudhry, supra note 9, at 835–36 (quoting PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A
CHANGING WORLD 18 (1995)).
56 The macro and micro level insights that I discuss are sometimes entwined.  For
example, critique of a specific legal test might be part of a broader normative critique.
See Annus, supra note 9, at 312–13 (noting that adopting what “might seem to be a rather
technical application of a legal test . . . actually requires the adoption of a normative
position”).
57 For background on the United States’ tiered approach to equal protection, see gen-
erally WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1016–19
(3d ed. 2003).  For criticisms, see, for example, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing tiered analysis); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); James E. Fleming, “There’s
Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An Appreciation of Justice Stevens’ Equal Protec-
tion Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301 (2006); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality
Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004).
58 521 U.S. 702, 734–35 (1997).
59 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 2; M.V. Lee Badgett, Prenuptial Jit-
ters: Did Gay Marriage Destroy Heterosexual Marriage in Scandinavia?, SLATE, May
20, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2100884/.
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II. HONG KONG & LEUNG: SCRUTINIZING SEXUAL
ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
This Part begins by painting the legal backdrop of Leung v. Secretary of
Justice and discussing the reasoning of both the lower court and the Court of
Appeal.  It then considers how the Hong Kong experience could be a consid-
eration in domestic discussions regarding sexual orientation discrimination,
equal protection doctrine, and disparate impact claims.  Hong Kong jurispru-
dence alone does not provide easy answers to American legal questions;
however, observing Hong Kong’s experience—together with experiences in
other peer jurisdictions—can enrich the discussions we have at home.  This
section explores how those discussions can be enriched.
A. The Backdrop
In 1997 the British transferred sovereignty of Hong Kong to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (“PRC” or “Mainland China”).  Since then Hong
Kong has existed as a Special Administrative Region (“SAR”) of the PRC.
As an SAR, Hong Kong maintains a high degree of autonomy, except in
certain legal domains, such as foreign affairs and defense.60
Under colonial rule, there were virtually no enforceable legal protec-
tions of human rights in Hong Kong.61  However, in the years leading up to
the handover, the colonial government secured Hong Kong’s post-handover
autonomy through a joint declaration with the PRC and implemented a series
of explicit human rights protections.62  Those protections were largely
prompted by demands from local Hong Kong residents who feared rights
incursions under PRC rule.  The pressure from local activists escalated dra-
matically in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, in which the PRC
government killed and injured many pro-democracy protesters on the Main-
land.63  Hong Kong’s Basic Law (often referred to as Hong Kong’s “mini-
constitution”) and Bill of Rights Ordinance now both protect individuals
60 For background on the historic handover and the current relationship between
Hong Kong and the PRC, see generally Albert H.Y. Chen, Constitutional Adjudication in
Post-1997 Hong Kong, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 627, 632 (2006).
61 The colonial government protected civil liberties by maintaining an independent
judiciary that abided by procedural rules and respected the right to jury trials for serious
criminal offenses.  It also promoted social, economic, and cultural rights through pro-
grams such as public education and government housing.  The colonial government, how-
ever, offered no enforceable protection of other human rights, such as equality or
freedom of expression. See Carole J. Petersen, From British Colony to Special Adminis-
trative Region of China, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY OF
TWELVE ASIAN JURISDICTIONS, FRANCE AND THE USA 226 (Randall Peerenboom et al. eds.,
2006).
62 See Michael C. Davis, Human Rights and the Founding of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 301, 312 (1996).
63 See id. at 307–18.
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from human rights infringements in the public sector.64  The Bill of Rights
was enacted in 1991.65  The Basic Law was promulgated in 1990 and entered
into force in 1997.66
The Hong Kong legislature has enacted antidiscrimination ordinances
that extend equality protections to the private sector.  The existing ordi-
nances—which cover discrimination based on sex, disability, and family sta-
tus—do not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity.67  Sodomy between men, however, was decriminalized in 1991.68
In addition, the executive branch of government has issued aspirational, non-
binding declarations against sexual orientation discrimination in the work-
place.69  It has also established a commission to educate the public on the
importance of equality for SOGI minorities and to study and mediate com-
plaints of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.70
In terms of gender identity rights, the Hong Kong government allows
certain transgender persons to change their Hong Kong identity cards and
passports to reflect their current sex.71  Their current sex is also recognized
for incarceration purposes.72  Transgender persons, however, have no legal
right to change the sex designation on their birth certificates, which deter-
mines one’s sex for most legal purposes, such as marriage and sex-specific
criminal laws.73  Unlike the government of the United States, the Hong Kong
government subsidizes surgical expenses for transgender individuals who
are prescribed surgical procedures by their doctors.74
64 Id. at 313–21.
65 Id. at 310.
66 See Lorenz Langer, The Elusive Aim of Universal Suffrage: Constitutional Devel-
opments in Hong Kong, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 419, 431 (2007).  For background on the first
ten years of adjudication under the Basic Law, see Po-Jen Yap, 10 Years of the Basic
Law:  The Rise, Retreat and Resurgence of Judicial Power in Hong Kong, 36 COMMON L.
WORLD REV. 166 (2007).
67 Sex Discrimination Ordinance, (1995) Cap. 480 (H.K.); Disability Discrimination
Ordinance, (1995) Cap. 489 (H.K.); Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, (1997) Cap.
527 (H.K.).  See also Carole J. Petersen, The Right to Equality in the Public Sector: An
Assessment of Post-Colonial Hong Kong, 32 HONG KONG L.J. 103 (2002) (evaluating the
three ordinances); Carole J. Petersen, Hong Kong’s First Anti-Discrimination Laws and
their Potential Impact on the Employment Market, 27 HONG KONG L.J. 324 (1997).
68 Hong Kong Crimes Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 200, 118 §§ M–N (H.K.).
69 See Hong Kong Home Affairs Bureau, Equal Opportunities: Sexual Orientation,
and Code of Practice against Discrimination in Employment on the Ground of Sexual
Orientation, http://www.hab.gov.hk/en/policy_responsibilities/the_rights_of_the_indivi
duals/sexual.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
70 See Hong Kong Home Affairs Bureau, Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation
Unit, at http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/equal_gender.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
71 Such recognition is generally limited to persons who have undergone surgeries
related to sex change. See Robyn Emerton, Neither Here nor There: The Current Status
of Transsexual and Other Transgender Persons Under Hong Kong Law, 34 HONG KONG
L.J. 245, 254 (2004).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 On Hong Kong, see id. at 250.  In contrast, both private and public health insur-
ance in the United States usually do not cover medical procedures relating to transgender
health. See Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social
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Leung built on this existing landscape of SOGI rights in Hong Kong.
The case, which was the first dispute on sexual orientation rights to reach the
Court of Appeal, was monumental for setting legal precedent interpreting the
Basic Law and Bill of Rights to protect sexual orientation rights.
B. Case Details
In 2004, William Roy Leung, a twenty-year-old gay man—or tongzhi,
as Chinese gay men often refer to themselves75—challenged four provisions
of the Hong Kong Crimes Ordinance for violating privacy and equality pro-
tections enshrined in the Basic Law and Bill of Rights.76  The first two im-
pugned provisions created disparate regulation of sexual conduct involving
more than two people.  Crimes Ordinance section 118(F)(2)(a) criminalized
“buggery” (anal sex) between men in the presence of more than two per-
sons; however, no comparable section criminalized vaginal intercourse or
opposite-sex buggery in the presence of more than two persons.77  Similarly,
section 118(J)(2)(a) made it criminal for a man to commit gross indecency
with another man in any context involving more than two persons (even in
private settings); meanwhile, there were no similar laws to regulate gross
indecency in opposite-sex and female-female contexts.78
The second two impugned provisions stipulated ages of consent.
Crimes Ordinance section 118(H) criminalized gross indecency between
men whenever one partner is under twenty-one; meanwhile, no comparable
provision existed for gross indecency between opposite-sex partners or two
and Legal Conceptualization of Gender that is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11
MICH. J. GENDER & LAW 253, 269 nn.54–55 (2004–05). But see Pinneke v. Preisser, 623
F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980) (extending Medicaid coverage to the patients’ sex change
procedures).
75 Tongzhi translates literally as “same will” and is commonly used as the translation
for “comrade.”  For more background on the term, see Institute for Tongzhi Studies,
http://www.tongzhistudies.org/about/aboutTongzhi.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2007).
76 Leung I ¶¶ 21–33 (describing the challenged provisions of the Crimes Ordinance).
Interestingly, William Roy Leung was an ethnic Chinese man who was from a blue-collar
family and educated in Hong Kong’s local schools.  Leung’s attorney remarked that
Leung’s local upbringing made his case more compelling.  If Leung had been educated
abroad, for instance, opponents might have painted his sexual orientation as a form of
Western decadence. See Ho Lai-Kit, Solicitor Michael Vidler on Billy Leung and Hong
Kong’s Age of Consent Ruling, FRIDAE, Sept. 26, 2006, available at http://www.fridae.
com/newsfeatures/article.php?articleid=1763&viewarticle=1 (interview of Leung’s
attorney).
77 See Leung I ¶¶ 32–33 (referencing Crimes Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 200,
§ 118(F)(2)(a).  (H.K)).
78 See id. ¶¶ 26–27.  The Crimes Ordinance does not define “gross indecency.” See
Crimes Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 200, § 118(J)(2)(a).  (H.K).  According to Leung I, the
term “covers sexual conduct with or towards another person that is offensive to common
propriety, each case being judged in the context of its own time, place and circum-
stance. . . .  [It includes] intimacy . . . that falls short of sexual intercourse.” Leung I ¶
16.
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female partners.79  Finally, section 118(C) set the age of consent for buggery
between men at twenty-one and made offenders punishable with life impris-
onment.80  Although a parallel provision similarly criminalized buggery be-
tween opposite-sex partners with a female under twenty-one, the age of
consent for vaginal sex was set at age sixteen and punishable with only five
years of imprisonment.81
Leung argued, and both the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeal
agreed,82 that all four provisions violated Articles 25 and 39 of the Basic
Law and Articles 1, 14, and 22 in Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights.83  The Basic Law’s Article 25 guarantees that “All Hong Kong re-
sidents shall be equal before the law.”84  Article 39 explicitly incorporates
international human rights treaties into Hong Kong law.85  Articles 1 and 22
of the Bill of Rights protect equality and Article 14 protects privacy.86
Most of the litigation was not very contentious.  The Hong Kong gov-
ernment conceded that, so long as the applicant had standing, all the con-
tested criminal provisions were unsustainable except for section 118(C),
which stipulated the age of consent for buggery.87  The first three provisions
were disputed only on procedural grounds.88 On appeal, the Hong Kong gov-
ernment only challenged the lower court’s decision regarding the age of con-
sent for buggery.89
The Court of Appeal focused its analysis on equality.  Writing for the
unanimous three-judge panel, Judge Geoffrey Ma acknowledged that, “[o]f
course, homosexual acts committed in private between consenting men are
an aspect of privacy so that, for example, the existence of legislation prohib-
iting such acts may constitute an infringement of the right to privacy.”90  He
reasoned, however, that the unequal age-of-consent regulations primarily
created a question of equality.91
79 See Leung I ¶¶ 22–25 (referencing Crimes Ordinance, (1991) Cap.200, § 118(H)
(H.K.)).
80 Crimes Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 200, § 118(C).  (H.K).
81 Leung I ¶¶ 28–33.  Interestingly, the parallel provision on heterosexual buggery
did not stipulate any age of consent for the male partner. See id.
82 Decisions from both the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeal have prece-
dential value.  The Court of Appeal is the second highest court in Hong Kong.  The gov-
ernment chose not to appeal Leung to the highest court, the Court of Final Appeal. See
Polly Hui, The Rights Stuff, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 16, 2006, at 20 (noting the
deadline for a final appeal).  On the hierarchy of courts in Hong Kong, see Hong Kong
Judiciary, Structure of the Courts, available at http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/
organization/courtchart.htm.
83 Leung I ¶¶ 34–42; Leung II ¶¶ 41, 56.
84 Hong Kong Basic Law, art. 25.
85 Id. art. 39.
86 Hong Kong Bill of Rights, No. 59, (1991) 1 O.H.K. § 1, 14, 22.
87 See Leung I ¶¶ 99–100.
88 See id.
89 See Leung II ¶ 15.
90 See id. ¶ 42.
91 See id. (“We are in these proceedings not so much concerned with the right to
privacy as that of equality.”).
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The government conceded that sexual orientation is a protected status
under Hong Kong’s Basic Law and Bill of Rights, even though the two laws
do not explicitly mention “sexual orientation.”92  The courts agreed.93 The
lower court noted that Hong Kong’s human rights jurisprudence is meant to
protect “historically disadvantaged . . . group[s] marked by stereotyped ca-
pacities,” such as groups based on sexual orientation.94  In rendering sexual
orientation protected grounds, the lower court also cited “[p]ersuasive juris-
prudence” from the UNHRC and the European Court of Human Rights.95
Regarding the disputed age-of-consent provision, the government as-
serted two main lines of defense.96  First, even though Hong Kong’s laws
proscribe sexual orientation discrimination, the disputed provision did not
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation because age-of-consent laws
for buggery were facially neutral;97 Hong Kong law set ages of consent for
both same-sex and opposite-sex buggery at twenty-one and made both
crimes punishable with life imprisonment.98  Second, even if the laws did
discriminate, discrimination was justified by countervailing government
interests.99
Judge Ma rejected both of the government’s defenses.  He announced
that Hong Kong’s Basic Law and Bill of Rights do not protect only against
direct discrimination, but also against laws that discriminate indirectly
through disparate impact.100  Judge Ma agreed with the lower court that “for
gay couples the only form of sexual intercourse available to them is anal
intercourse,” and that “[d]enying persons of a minority class the right to
sexual expression in the only way available to them, even if that way is
92 See id. ¶ 46.
93 See Leung I ¶¶ 44–46; see also Leung II ¶ 46.
94 Leung I ¶ 44; see also Leung II ¶ 46 (agreeing with the lower court).
95 See Leung I ¶¶ 45–46; see also Leung II ¶ 46 (agreeing with the lower court).  Had
the court cited the UNHRC and the European Court of Human Rights as binding, Leung
arguably would not be evidence of cross-cultural convergence, but perhaps would be
evidence of foreign domination.  However, because the court was simply persuaded by
international and foreign developments and their compatibility with Hong Kong’s laws,
the court’s decision should be read as convergence among legal systems rather than one
blindly following another. Cf. Hong Kong Basic Law, art. 84 (stipulating that Hong
Kong courts “may” cite other common law jurisdictions, but not obligating the courts to
do so).
96 The government also suggested a third argument, that buggery is not comparable to
vaginal intercourse and, thus, men who commit buggery are not similarly situated to
heterosexuals who engage in vaginal sex. See Leung II ¶ 46.  The government itself,
however, did not seem committed to this argument. See id. ¶ 47(6) (noting that the
government “was not really pushing [this point] with any great vigour”).
97 See id. ¶ 48.
98 See id. ¶¶ 28–33; see also supra text accompanying note 81.
99 See Leung II ¶ 51.
100 See id. ¶ 48 (stating that the law was objectionable because it “significantly af-
fects homosexual men in an adverse way compared with heterosexuals.  The impact on
the former group is significantly greater than on the latter”).
\\server05\productn\H\HLG\31-1\HLG102.txt unknown Seq: 19 28-DEC-07 15:10
2008] Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity 85
denied to all, remains discriminatory when persons of a majority class are
permitted the right to sexual expression in a way natural to them.”101
To determine whether the discrimination could be justified, Judge Ma
applied Hong Kong’s proportionality test: “Any restriction on a constitu-
tional right can only be justified if: (a) it is rationally connected to a legiti-
mate purpose; and (b) the means used to restrict that right must be no more
than is necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose in question.”102  In-
voking an old adage, Ma explained that the state must show “that a sledge-
hammer has not been used to crack a nut.”103
Ma found no justification for the discrimination.  He suggested that the
government had a legitimate interest in protecting citizens’ medical health,
but stated that the age-of-consent regulations were not grounded in medical
reason.104  During legislative debates, some council members suggested that
the age-of-consent regulations would prevent young men from blackmailing
older partners who did not want to disclose their relationship or sexual orien-
tation.105  Ma rejected that argument, noting the lack of evidence that lower-
ing the age of consent to sixteen would increase the risk of blackmail beyond
that which also exists between heterosexual partners.106
C. Coloring the View of American Law
What can Americans take away from Leung?  Certainly, Americans
should not blindly follow Hong Kong or any other foreign jurisdiction.
Hong Kong is, however, another data point to consider when jurists reflect
on American law.  At the macro level, Leung contributes to an existing nor-
mative critique of American protection against sexual orientation discrimi-
nation. Leung also contributes to an existing critique of American resistance
to disparate impact theory.  At the micro level, Leung offers support to com-
mentators who have criticized the practicality of specific legal tests in the
United States’ equal protection jurisprudence.
101 Id.  A shortcoming of the court’s language is that it oversimplifies human sexual-
ity.  One could note that many same-sex male couples engage in very meaningful forms
of sexual expression aside from buggery—for example, oral sex.
102 Id. ¶ 44.
103 Id. ¶ 50.
104 See id. ¶ 51(2).
105 See, e.g., H. K. Security Bureau, Written Response to the LegCo Panel on Home
Affairs Subcomm., H. K. Legis. Council Paper No. CB(2)2000/00-01(01), ¶ 5 (2001)
(“The rationale of making a man under 21 who commits consensual buggery with an-
other man criminally liable was to guard against the possibility of blackmail against the
other partner.”).
106 See Leung II ¶ 51(5).  Notably, the Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission
had previously spoken out against the blackmail-prevention justification. See H. K.
Equal Opportunities Comm’n, Comments by EOC to the Response of the Administration
to LegCo Panel on Home Affairs Subcomm., Paper No. CB(2)2185/00-01(01), ¶¶ 46
(2001).
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The Leung case contributes to an ever-growing normative view that in-
dividuals have the right to live free from discrimination on the ground of
sexual orientation.  Legal institutions in peer jurisdictions, representing di-
verse cultural backgrounds, have wrestled with sexual orientation discrimi-
nation and determined that—like race and sex—discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation is rarely justified.107  Hong Kong has now joined in,
stating that “[w]here there is an apparent breach of rights based on race, sex
or sexual orientation, court[s] will scrutinize with intensity the reasons said
to constitute justification.”108
The United States has also taken important steps to fight sexual orienta-
tion discrimination,109 but its commitment to doing so is unclear.  To date,
the Supreme Court and almost all other federal and state courts only review
cases of sexual orientation discrimination under “rational basis review.”110
Rational basis review is far less demanding than the level of scrutiny applied
to sexual orientation discrimination in Hong Kong and other peer jurisdic-
tions.111 Leung, coupled with similar cases from around the world, should
107 See supra notes 29–37 and accompanying text.
108 Leung II ¶ 53 (internal quotation omitted).
109 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that Texas’s criminal-
ization of private, consensual, same-sex sodomy violated constitutionally protected lib-
erty interests); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating an amendment to the
Colorado Constitution that banned antidiscrimination laws that protect sexual orientation
minorities).
110 Under traditional rational basis review, courts uphold any law that is “rationally
related” to a “legitimate government interest” and defer greatly to the legislature in de-
fining those terms.  Rational basis review does not require any proportionality between
intended ends and the means used to achieve those ends. See generally MURPHY ET AL.,
supra note 57, at 1016–19 (summarizing judicial and academic criticism of the tiered
Equal Protection model).  Sometimes, under rational basis review, the Court has scruti-
nized laws to see if they were driven purely by animus.  Commentators have differenti-
ated this type of review from traditional rational basis review, calling it rational basis
“with bite.” See id.  Even rational basis with bite, however, requires less scrutiny than
Hong Kong’s proportionality test because, so long as a law is not purely motivated by
animus, the law is valid regardless of whether the means are proportionate to the ends
sought.  Consider Anderson v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006), in which the
Washington Supreme Court upheld the state’s ban on same-sex marriage.  The court
stated, “[t]urning first to the plaintiffs’ claim that [the marriage ban] was motivated by
animus, we cannot agree that the only reason the legislation was enacted was because of
anti-gay sentiment.” Id. at 980–81.  It then proceeded to employ a very deferential stan-
dard of review:
The statute is presumed constitutional . . . .  [T]he court may assume the exis-
tence of any conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification . . . .  In fact, the rational basis standard may be satisfied where the
legislative choice . . . is based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or
empirical data.  In addition, within limits, a statute generally does not fail rational
basis review on the grounds of over- or under-inclusiveness; a classification does
not fail rational-basis review because it is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequity.
Id. at 980 (internal citations omitted).
111 On Hong Kong’s proportionality test, see supra notes 99–103 and accompanying
text.  Like Hong Kong, jurisdictions such as the European Court of Human Rights, Ca-
nada, and South Africa all subject sexual orientation discrimination to a proportionality
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prompt Americans to question the normative posture of the United States’
sexual orientation jurisprudence.112
The normative critique of American equal protection jurisprudence is
intertwined with a functional critique of the United States’ tiered approach to
equal protection.  Under its tiered approach, the United States assigns forms
of discrimination to tiers that correspond to different standards of review:
strict scrutiny (for discrimination based on race, national origin, and alien-
age), intermediate scrutiny (sex and legitimacy), and rational basis review
(everything else).113
Numerous commentators—including Justices Marshall and Stevens—
have criticized the tiered system for being too rigid.114  As cases concerning
new grounds of discrimination arise, the Court has had difficulty fitting the
cases neatly into its tiered framework.115  Commentators claim that the Su-
preme Court has generated confusion by saying one thing while doing an-
other; the Court says that it maintains a three-tier framework for equal
protection, but its actions suggest otherwise.116  James Fleming has argued
test that requires greater scrutiny than does rational basis review. See, e.g., L & V v.
Austria, App. Nos. 39392/98 and 39829/98, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1022, at 1033-35 (2003)
(Commission report) (using a proportionality test to review a constitutional challenge
against sexual orientation discrimination); Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at
557–62 (Can.) (same); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of
Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at 30-31 (S. Afr.) (same).
112 For other foreign cases that, like Leung, subjected sexual orientation discrimina-
tion to review more stringent than rational basis review, see supra note 111 (citing cases
from the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Canada, and Constitu-
tional Court of South Africa).  While foreign developments are not necessary to legiti-
mize questioning of American sexual orientation jurisprudence, these developments
support such inquiries, making them all the more pressing.  In the United States, advo-
cates and commentators have argued that sexual orientation should be a “suspect” classi-
fication reviewed under strict or intermediate scrutiny; however, such arguments have
repeatedly failed.  For background on the doctrine of “suspect classifications” and an
argument that sexual orientation be deemed one, see Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d
699, 723-28 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring).
113 See generally MURPHY ET AL., supra note 57, at 1016–19.  In the United States,
courts typically review religious discrimination pursuant to the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise Clause instead of equal protection’s tiered framework. See Kenji Yoshino, As-
similationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t
Ask Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 495 n.33 (1998); Robin Charlow, The Elusive Mean-
ing of Religious Equality, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1529, 1565 n.146 (2005).
114 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“To begin, I must once more voice my disagreement with the
Court’s rigidified approach to equal protection analysis.”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I am inclined to believe that what has become
known as the two-tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a com-
pletely logical method of deciding cases.”).
115 See Note, Justice Stevens’ Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1146, 1146 (1987) (“As the range and complexity of equal protection challenges grows,
the utility of the static categories of minimum rationality, heightened scrutiny, and strict
scrutiny for analyzing legislative or administrative classifications diminishes.”).
116 See, e.g., id.; see also Fleming, supra note 57.
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that, despite the Court’s rhetoric of maintaining a three-tier framework, it has
arguably created a six-tier framework that continues to grow more tiers.117
For example, “rational basis review” traditionally required deference to
the legislative branch.118  In Romer v. Evans, however, the Court said it ap-
plied rational basis review to invalidate a Colorado constitutional amend-
ment that banned sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws within the state;
however, the Court did not defer to Colorado’s legislature and instead scruti-
nized legislative objectives for animus that the Court deemed illegitimate.119
It seems that the Court was normatively committed to protecting sexual ori-
entation minorities and decided to stretch the meaning of rational basis re-
view to do so, in effect creating an implicit new tier that commentators have
called “rational basis with bite.”120
In its equal protection jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has left lower
courts with unclear doctrine that is difficult to follow.121  Even though com-
mentators such as James Fleming have argued that the Supreme Court has
implicitly moved away from its rigid three-tier framework, lower courts con-
tinue a strict application of the three-tier framework.122  For example, lower
courts often review sexual orientation discrimination under traditional ra-
tional basis review, and not rational basis with bite.123
To remedy doctrinal obfuscation, the Court can do away with its tiered
framework and adopt a single standard of review for equal protection cases,
as advocated by Justice Stevens.124  Hong Kong’s proportionality test is a
117 See Fleming, supra note 57, at 2304–10.  For additional support of Fleming’s ar-
gument, see also William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Stan-
dard of Equal Protection, 29 TUL. L. REV. 519, 584 (2005) (noting “the erosion, over the
last twenty years, of the Court’s three-tiered scrutiny structure”).
118 See Lawrence Friedman, Ordinary and Enhanced Rational Basis Review in the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: A Preliminary Investigation, 69 ALB. L. REV.
415, 416 (2005) (“[r]ational basis scrutiny as ordinarily understood as exceedingly def-
erential to the political branches of government”); Goldberg, supra note 57, at 489 (ex-
plaining that rational basis review is a “deferential approach to the law- and
policymaking branches”); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite:
Why the Supreme Court Should Recognize Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to
Classes Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2773 (2005) (describ-
ing rational basis review as “extremely deferential to any proffered government
interest”).
119 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630–32 (1996).
120 See MURPHY ET. AL, supra note 57, at 1016–19 (discussing rational basis with bite;
arguably, the Court also applied rational basis with bite to City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) and Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
121 See Smith, supra note 118 (arguing that while the Supreme Court has applied
rational basis with bite to sexual orientation discrimination, it has not done so explicitly
and thus left lower courts confused; many courts still only apply traditional rational basis
review to sexual orientation cases).
122 See Fleming, supra note 57.
123 See Smith, supra note 118, at 2785–95 (summarizing cases in which courts ap-
plied traditional rational basis review to sexual orientation discrimination).
124 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“There is
only one Equal Protection Clause.  It requires every State to govern impartially.  It does
not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different stan-
dard in other cases.”).
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potential source of inspiration for a single standard.  Hong Kong applies the
same proportionality test to equal protection cases regardless of the classifi-
cation involved: race, sex, sexual orientation, etc.125  Other peer jurisdic-
tions—including Canada, the European Court of Human Rights, and South
Africa—also employ a single proportionality test.126  While it is outside the
scope of this Article to analyze comprehensively the pros and cons of adopt-
ing a singular proportionality test, this discussion highlights the fact that the
United States could benefit from greater dialogue on the potential benefits of
proportionality doctrines developed in peer jurisdictions.127  Not only would
a singular proportionality test remedy doctrinal obfuscation, it might also
foster desirable transparency, objectivity, and determinacy in legal
analysis.128
Finally, Leung furthers an existing normative critique of the United
States’ posture on disparate impact claims.  Recall that, in Leung, both the
lower court and the Court of Appeal stated that the Basic Law and Bill of
Rights protect against indirect discrimination through disparate impact.129
While the Basic Law and Bill of Rights govern only state actions, numerous
Hong Kong statutes that prohibit discrimination in the private sector also
remedy indirect discrimination.130  Hong Kong joins many other peer juris-
dictions in taking a firm stance against disparate impact discrimination.131
125 See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text.
126 See supra note 111.
127 Vicki Jackson has begun this conversation, encouraging Americans to discuss the
possibility of adopting other jurisdictions’ proportionality tests in numerous areas of con-
stitutional adjudication, including equal protection. See Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent
Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on “Pro-
portionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 606–34 (1999); see also
Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional about Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803
(2003).
128 After studying proportionality tests in a variety of jurisdictions around the world,
David Beatty has argued that proportionality tests generally foster transparency, objectiv-
ity, and determinacy; reviewing Beatty’s work, however, Vicki Jackson has argued that
Beatty’s arguments are helpful but not conclusive. See Jackson, Being Proportional
about Proportionality, supra note 127.
129 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
130 Hong Kong’s Sex Discrimination Ordinance, Disability Discrimination Ordinance,
and Family Status Discrimination Ordinance all protect against indirect discrimination.
See Petersen, Hong Kong’s First Anti-Discrimination Laws, supra note 67, at 337–49
(discussing indirect discrimination under the three ordinances).  Hong Kong’s pending
race discrimination bill also protects against indirect discrimination. See Hong Kong
Home Affairs Bureau, Race Discrimination Bill, § 4(1)(b), available at http://www.
cmab.gov.hk/doc/en/documents/policy_responsibilities/the_rights_of_the_individuals/
race/RaceDiscriminationBill_e.pdf.
131 See, e.g., Rosemary C. Hunter & Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Discrimi-
nation: American Oddity or Internationally Accepted Concept?, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 108, 115–24 (1998) (discussing the significant incorporation of disparate impact
theory into international human rights treaties and jurisprudence in the European Court of
Justice, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada).
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The United States, meanwhile, stands in contrast.  In the United States,
federal statutes protect against indirect discrimination.132 In its equal protec-
tion jurisprudence, however, the Supreme Court has stated that the Constitu-
tion does not protect against indirect discrimination the way it protects
against direct discrimination, except in rare cases where the plaintiff can
show that the disparate impact was caused by a “discriminatory motive.”  In
other words, proving an unequal impact does not suffice and the plaintiff
must prove invidious intent.133  The requirement of proving intent has essen-
tially precluded legal challenges to certain government policies such as ra-
cial profiling, because proving intent in such cases of disparate impact
discrimination is virtually impossible.134
The United States deviates from peer jurisdictions that have more
broadly incorporated protections against indirect discrimination into their
laws.135  Many American commentators have condemned the narrow reach
132 See id. at 126-27.  Those two statutes are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000), and the Americans
with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.
133 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 236–44 (1976) (rejecting arguments that
the Equal Protection clause treats direct and indirect discrimination similarly).  Title VII
and the ADA do not require a showing of discriminatory motive. See supra note 132.
134 See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling after September 11: The Department of
Justice’s 2003 Guidelines, 50 LOY. L. REV. 67, 72–74 (2004) (summarizing equal protec-
tion case law on racial profiling, including disparate impact claims).
135 See, e.g., Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson, Brown v. Board of Education: Fifty
Years Later, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 503, 510–11 (2005):
In the United States, proof of an intention to discriminate is an essential require-
ment of claims for indirect discrimination under the Equal Protection clause.  In
South Africa, proof of intention to discriminate is not a requirement of the claim.
In reaching this conclusion, the South African Constitutional Court referred to
decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court, and the European Court of Justice, and
chose to follow their approach to this issue, rather than that of the majority of the
United States Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis.
See also Hunter & Shoben, supra note 131, at 131–36 (examining disparate impact juris-
prudence in the European Court of Justice, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, and UN treaty bodies, and asserting that “[t]he limitations imposed on the appli-
cation of disparate impact analysis in the United States have not been reflected in interna-
tional jurisdictions”).
Somewhat surprisingly, the status of indirect discrimination claims at the European
Court of Human Rights is unclear.  Virtually all of the court’s equality cases have con-
cerned direct discrimination.  Recently, however, the court held that the Czech govern-
ment had not violated the equality rights of Roma minority simply because it
disproportionately placed Roma children in schools for students with learning disabilities.
See D.H. & Others v. Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 923 (2006).
The holding was very fact-specific, noting, inter alia, that many Roma parents requested
that their children attend the special schools and that the school assignments were based
on expert-created tests implemented to best serve children with disabilities. See id. at 925
¶ 10, 935–36 ¶¶ 46–49, 938 ¶ O–I5 (Costa, J., concurring).  The court left open a door for
indirect discrimination claims, but did not clearly articulate the required elements for a
successful claim:
[T]he Court observes that, if a policy or general measure has disproportionately
prejudicial effects on a group of people, the possibility of its being considered
discriminatory cannot be ruled out even if it is not specifically aimed or directed
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of disparate impact theory in the United States.136  Those domestic critics can
derive normative support from experiences in peer jurisdictions, including
Hong Kong.  To some degree, developments abroad also provide potential
doctrinal models for regulating indirect discrimination in the United States
and curb fears that remedying indirect discrimination more broadly would
open the floodgates to litigation.137
III. SOUTH KOREA & FAMILY REGISTER: A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT
FOR GENDER IDENTITY RIGHTS
This Part begins by providing background on the socio-legal dynamics
leading to Family Register and details regarding the case.  It then discusses
how Family Register, coupled with other foreign legal developments, could
enrich discussions on gender identity rights in the United States.
A. The Backdrop
For much of its history, South Korea was a military dictatorship com-
monly viewed as having a poor human rights record.138  The situation began
to change in the late 1980s, when the country embarked on its democratiza-
tion process.139  Between then and now, South Korea has ratified major inter-
national human rights treaties, elected four presidents through democratic
elections, passed constitutional amendments and statutory laws to protect
human rights, developed an independent judiciary to enforce those rights,
and established an independent National Human Rights Commission to
study the country’s human rights conditions and recommend change.140
at that group.  However, statistics are not by themselves sufficient to disclose a
practice which could be classified as discriminatory.
Id. at 935, ¶ 46.
136 See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 375 n.5
(2007) (listing law review articles that have criticized the limited cognizability of dispa-
rate impact claims in the United States).
137 I offer this observation as a cursory generalization.  Cultural factors, such as the
United States’ litigious culture, may limit comparative insights (i.e., the floodgates con-
cern may be uniquely American).
138 See Chaihark Hahm, Human Rights in Korea, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA, supra
note 61, at 265.
139 See id.
140 See generally id.; Cho Hyo-Je, Human Rights in Korea at the Crossroads: A Criti-
cal Overview, 42 KOREA J. 204 (2002).  For clarification purposes, I should note that
South Korea has two national courts of final appeal, the Supreme Court and the Constitu-
tional Court.  Both courts have jurisdiction over constitutional questions, but in different
contexts.  For background on the two courts, see generally Hahm Chaihark, Rule of Law
in South Korea, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW 385, 388-90 (Randall Peer-
enboom, ed. 2004).
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South Korea’s human rights record still has significant room for improve-
ment,141 but South Korea’s overall record now garners significant praise.142
Rights movements among minority groups—including SOGI minori-
ties—are relatively new to the agenda of South Korea’s human rights advo-
cates.143  Mobilization for SOGI rights did not take shape until the mid-
1990s.144  Legal reform on SOGI issues has been modest but significant, con-
sidering the recency of the movement.  As Oh Ga Ram, an official of the
Korean Gay Men’s Human Rights Group has remarked, “We feel that the
last 10 years is the equivalent of a hundred years because so many [posi-
tive] changes occurred in such a short period.”145
Same-sex relationships have not been criminalized in South Korea, ex-
cept in the military.146  There are no statutes or significant case law that pro-
tect against sexual orientation discrimination.  Nonetheless, the National
Human Rights Commission (“Commission”) considers sexual orientation to
be a prohibited basis for discrimination.147  Although the Commission’s re-
ports and opinions are not binding, they have significant persuasive power
on the rest of the South Korean government.  For example, in 2003, the
Commission played a significant role in convincing the government censor-
ship bureau to remove depictions of homosexuality from its definition of
“obscene.”148  The Commission is now in the process of developing recom-
mendations for a nationwide sexual orientation antidiscrimination law.149
141 For example, human rights monitors often criticize South Korea’s controversial
National Security Law.  Although the law is rarely invoked by the government, it still
gives the government arguably objectionable discretion to define and restrict subversive
activity. See Cho, supra note 140, at 208–11; Hahm, supra note 138, at 276–83.
142 See supra note 50 (listing publications in which the United States has praised
South Korea for its human rights record).
143 See Cho, supra note 140, at 218–19.
144 See id.
145 NORIMITSU ONISHI, Gay-Themed Film Gives Closet Door a Tug, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
31, 2006, at A4 (quoting Oh).
146 See Military Penal Code, art. 92 (S. Kor. 2001) (criminalizing same-sex sexual
activity); Hyung-Ki Choi et al., South Korea, in THE CONTINUUM COMPLETE INTERNA-
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEXUALITY, 949 (Kinsey Institute ed., 2004), available at http://
www.kinseyinstitute.org/ccies/kr.php (“Korea has no sodomy laws proscribing oral or
anal intercourse, except a military law against homosexual relationships in the army.”).
147 Korean National Human Rights Commission Act, arts. 30(2), 31 (S. Kor. 2001).
148 See Douglas Sanders, Health and Rights in Asia, PUKAAR, Jan. 2007, at 1, 3, avail-
able at http://www.nfi.net/NFI%20Publications/Pukaar/2007/JanPukaar07new.pdf; Int’l
Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Comm’n, Republic of Korea: Homosexuality Removed
from Classification of “Harmful and Obscene” in Youth Protection Law (Apr. 22, 2003),
available at http://www.iglhrc.org/site/iglhrc/section.php?id=5&detail=421; Onishi,
supra note 145.
149 See Sanders, supra note 148.  As this Article goes to press, it is unclear whether
the Korean government will embrace the Commission’s recommendations.  In October
2007, the Korean Justice Ministry announced that it would propose an antidiscrimination
bill that included numerous protected statuses, including sexual orientation.  A month
later, the Justice Ministry responded to criticism from conservative Christian groups by
removing sexual orientation from its draft; it now faces mounting pressure to reinsert
sexual orientation as a protected status. See Associated Press, Critics Blast South Korean
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The removal of homosexuality from the definition of obscenity has
given sexual orientation minorities a new visibility.  For example, in 2006,
King and the Clown, a film positively depicting romantic relationships be-
tween men, broke the box office record for most popular film in South Ko-
rea—viewed by one in four residents.150  Although homosexuality remains
very taboo among Koreans, new visibility for sexual orientation minorities
has opened the door to constructive discourse.151
In some regards, transgender persons have been even more prominently
visible in South Korean society than sexual orientation minorities.  Harisu, a
well-received male-to-female (“MTF”) singer, actress, and model in South
Korea, has been at the forefront of both pop culture and legal reform.152  By
petitioning a district court, Harisu changed her legally recognized sex in
2002 and married her male partner in May 2007.153  Harisu’s legal journey
was broadly covered by the Korean media.154 Other transgender persons in
the public eye include the pop music group, Lady, featuring three MTF
singers.155
Despite Harisu’s legal success, district courts had been inconsistent in
deciding whether South Koreans have a right to change their legally recog-
nized sex.  That inconsistency prompted Family Register, which was the sec-
ond Supreme Court case on transgender recognition.156  In the first case,
decided in 1996, the Supreme Court stated that a post-operative157 MTF
could not be recognized as a woman for the purposes of Korea’s sex-specific
rape laws.158 Family Register turned the legal tide, marking a significant
development for gender identity rights.
Nondiscrimination Bill for Excluding Gays, Lesbians, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 8, 2007,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/08/asia/AS-GEN-SKorea-Gays.php.
150 See Onishi, supra note 145 (discussing the film’s success); Shim Sun-ah, Korea in
Dilemma Over Transgenders’ Right to Choose, KOREA TIMES (Seoul), May, 23, 2006 (on
file with author).
151 See Onishi, supra note 145.
152 See Shim, supra note 150; Kim Tae-jong, Singer Harisu to Get Married in May,
KOREA TIMES (Seoul), Feb. 22, 2007 (on file with author).
153 See Kim, supra note 152; S. Korea Transsexual Ties the Knot, REUTERS, May 19,
2007, available at http://in.news.yahoo.com/070519/137/6fzn4.html
154 See Kim, supra note 152.
155 See Elizabeth Davies, Asia Falls for a Girl Band of Former Boys, INDEPENDENT
(U.K.), Oct. 22, 2005, at 33.
156 In re Change of Name and Correction of Family Register, 2004 Seu 42 (S. Kor.
June 22, 2006), available at http://library.scourt.go.kr/jsp/html/decision/2_67.2004seu42.
htm.
157 It is worth clarifying that, as they are commonly used, the terms “sex-reassign-
ment surgery” and “post-operative” are generalizations.  The range of surgical proce-
dures that transsexuals undergo varies from one individual to another.  Thus, there is no
universal form of “sex-reassignment surgery” and there is no clear definition of what it
means to be “post-operative.”  In Family Register, however, the Supreme Court specified
the types of surgery individuals must undergo before they have the right to change their
legally recognized sex. See infra notes 171–173 and accompanying text.
158 Korea’s rape laws only protect women from men.  Because the complainant in the
1996 case was not recognized as a female, her attacker was only convicted of harassment,
receiving a lighter sentence than that usually received for rape. See Email from Seung-
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B. Case Details
Family Register addressed the issue of whether, under the Family Reg-
ister Act (“Act”),159 post-operative transsexuals have the right to attain legal
recognition of their current sex.160  The family register contains public
records of Korean citizens’ familial relationships.161  Article 120 of the Act
stipulates that interested parties shall apply to correct the family register if
they recognize an impermissible or incorrect record.162  Meanwhile, the com-
plementary provision, Article 22, stipulates that if a record is incorrect or
void, local governments must correct the records.163  The Act, however, does
not specify the scope of corrections that are permitted.164
Korean citizens’ sex is captured in the register at time of birth and is
deemed their sex for all legal purposes.165  Because the Act does not explic-
itly speak to the correction of one’s listed sex, the Court needed to decide
whether changing a transsexual’s listed sex amounted to a “correction.”166
In doing so, the majority stated that the legislative purpose of Article 120 “is
to correct what is recorded on the family register if it is obviously not legiti-
mate or against the truth.”167
The applicant in Family Register was recorded as a woman at birth; at
the time of the case, he self-identified as a man.168  He asserted that he began
living as a man in his twenties.169  The court noted that the applicant worked
in the masculine field of construction work.170  At the age of forty-one, in
1992, he was diagnosed “as transsexual,” and had his breasts, uterus, and
vagina removed; afterwards, he had an operation to receive artificial testicles
and a penis.171  Since then, the applicant has received male hormones and
now has the “body and appearance of a man.”172  According to the court, the
hyun Lee, Founding & Steering Member of the Korean Transgender Human Rights Alli-
ance (Feb. 6, 2007, 04:42) (on file with author). See also Kim Rahn, Transsexual Ruling
to Bring Changes, KOREA TIMES (Seoul), June 24, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
22025946.
159 In re Change of Name and Correction of Family Register, 2004 Seu 42 (June 22,
2006) (S. Kor.).
160 Id.




165 See id. § 2(B). See also What Flows From Transsexuals Changing Legal Sex?,
CHOSUN ILBO (English Edition), June 22, 2006, available at http://english.chosun.com/
w21data/html/news/200606/200606220033.html (explaining that transsexuals who regis-
ter their current sex will be able to marry members of their former sex); Interview with
Prof. Hyunah Yang, supra note 6.
166 Family Register, 2004 Seu 42 § 2(B)(3).
167 Id.





\\server05\productn\H\HLG\31-1\HLG102.txt unknown Seq: 29 28-DEC-07 15:10
2008] Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity 95
applicant “is recognized as a man in individual and social life,” and lived
with a female partner who was aware of his history.173  Finally, the majority
noted that the applicant had no criminal record or financial difficulties that
would lead one to question the applicant’s motive for sex change.174
The ten-justice majority held that the applicant could change his sex
designation in the register and also change his name to reflect his sex.175  To
support its conclusion, the Court made two main points.  First, relying on
medical research, the Court stated that one’s sex is determined by more than
just biological factors.176  Thus, the sex recorded at one’s birth, which is de-
termined by biology alone, can be incorrect because it does not take into
consideration emotional and social factors.177  Second, the Court stated that
transsexuals’ human dignity is protected by the Korean Constitution and that
maintaining transsexuals’ original sex designation in the register com-
promises that right to dignity.178
In its opinion, the Court defined the class of persons who are legally
recognized transsexuals with the right to change their sex and name.  The
Court listed a series of criteria that can be organized into two broad catego-
ries: medical and social.  In terms of medical criteria, the applicant must
undergo psychiatric treatment, hormone therapy, and surgical operations to
obtain the sex organs and other physical features of the opposite sex.179  In
order to undergo these processes, a doctor must have first diagnosed the
applicant with transsexualism, which requires the patient to feel that she was
born into the wrong body.180  In terms of social criteria, the applicant must
prove that she “plays the role” of the post-operative sex in personal and
social relationships, and receives social recognition for her post-operative
sex, causing no negative impact on existing relationships or on public policy
generally.181
Justice Kim Ji-hyung wrote a supplementary (concurring) opinion.  He
stressed that the court should interpret statutes in ways that give effect to
constitutional rights.182  He also cited foreign developments in Europe, Ja-
pan, and individual states in the United States as persuasive evidence that
transsexuals should have a right to legal recognition of their post-operative
sex and that allowing Korean transsexuals to change their registry records
would be administratively feasible.183
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. § 2(C).
176 Id. § 1.
177 See id. §§ 1, 2(B)(2)–(3).
178 Id. § 2(B)(1) (citing S. Korea Const. arts. 10, 34–1, 37–2).
179 Id. § 1(C).
180 See id. §§ 1(B)–(C).
181 Id. § 1(C).
182 See id. § 6(A) (Kim, J., concurring).
183 See id. § 6(G).
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In their dissenting opinion, Justices Son Ji-yol and Justice Park Jae-
yoon “agree[d] . . . that the legal and institutional system needs to be com-
plemented so that transsexuals can enjoy the right to have dignity and value
that is guaranteed by the Constitution.”184  However, they dissented because
they believed those rights need to be protected through new legislation, as
opposed to the Family Register Act.  They stated that what transsexuals un-
dergo is a “change” and not a “correction” that can trigger Article 120 of
the Act.185  They also thought that legal determination of sex change requires
a more complicated administrative assessment than what Article 120 of the
Act allows.186
C. Reflecting on American Law
As with the Hong Kong case, Family Register contributes to a norma-
tive critique of American law.  South Korea joins a growing number of juris-
dictions that legally recognize transsexuals’ post-operative sex.  Notably,
those jurisdictions represent both East and West.  For example, the European
Court of Human Rights has held that transsexuals have a right to legal recog-
nition of their post-operative sex.187  Meanwhile, among Asian jurisdictions,
Japan, Singapore, and now South Korea all have laws that grant transsexuals
some legal recognition of their post-operative sex.188
Again, most parts of the world still do not protect transsexuals’ right to
such recognition.  However, the fact that jurisdictions with respectable
human rights records, from divergent cultural backgrounds, are converging
in moral opinion on gender identity rights should prompt the United States
to reconsider its position on transgender issues.189
Currently in the United States, the majority of states offer options for
transsexuals who have undergone surgical procedures to change the sex des-
ignation on their birth certificates, drivers’ licenses, and other documents.190
Those options, however, carry very limited practical significance.  Gener-
ally, even though one administrative agency (for example, the agency that
issues drivers licenses or birth certificates) may change a transsexual’s sex
designation on a particular identification document, courts and other govern-
184 Id. § 5(A) (Son, J. & Park, J., dissenting).
185 See id. § 5(C)–(D).
186 See id.
187 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 (2002); I v. United Kingdom,
36 Eur. Ct. H. R. (2002).
188 See Emerton, supra note 38, at 545–55.  As this piece was being finalized for
publication, the Supreme Court (First Division) of the Philippines held that transgender
individuals who have undergone sex reassignment surgery cannot legally change the sex
designation on their birth certificates; in doing so, the court reversed a lower court deci-
sion. See Sylverio v. Philippines, G.R. No. 174689 (S.C. Oct. 22, 2007), available at
http://web.hku.hk/~sjwinter/TransgenderASIA/FilsSCfulldecision.pdf.
189 See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing factors affecting the persua-
siveness of foreign law).
190 See generally Dean Spade, supra note 7.
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mental institutions often will not recognize that document change as having
legal force.191  For example, in In re Marriage of Simmons, Illinois courts
refused to recognize a female-to-male (“FTM”) as legally male for marriage
purposes, even though his birth certificate—issued and amended in Illi-
nois—identified him as male.192  Changes in one particular state’s documents
are also often disregarded by other state governments and by the federal
government.193  In short, in the United States, changing one’s sex in identifi-
cation documents has symbolic value and some limited practical value,194 but
dubious legal value.
Developments in South Korea and other peer jurisdictions should
prompt Americans, especially American lawmakers, to challenge their own
assumptions.  Many Americans hold a “common sense” belief that individu-
als’ sex designations fit neatly into male/female binary categories that are
fixed at birth,195 despite the fact that medical opinion already challenges that
assumption.196  Now, developments abroad, such as Family Register, chal-
lenge that assumption by officially recognizing that one’s sex can change.
The sensibilities that some Americans believe are “common,” therefore, are
not commonly held by policymakers and judges in the United States’ peer
jurisdictions.
As time passes, the practical effects of the South Korean case will be-
come evident.  Eventually scholars, legislators, and judges in the United
States will be able to look to South Korea, among other places, for empirical
evidence on administrative consequences of sex change recognition.  Oppo-
nents of allowing changes to one’s legal sex often invoke doomsday predic-
tions.  For example, in a 2004 case concerning an FTM, the attorney
opposing sex change recognition remarked: “If Michael can be a male be-
cause Michael thinks he is a male, and because of some surgery, your
191 See generally id.
192 In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), review denied,
839 N.E.2d 1037 (Ill. 2005).
193 See, e.g., Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), cert.
denied, 898 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2005) (holding that a transsexual was a male at the time of
marriage despite the change of sex on the MTF’s Ohio birth certificate); Spade, supra
note 7 (discussing the frequency with which transgender people must rely on medical
evidence of their gender identity even if they have appropriate legal documents).
194 Updated documentation can have practical effects in everyday life. See Spade,
supra note 7, at 2 (“Changing the gender marker on [identification] documents from
[transgender individuals’] birth-assigned gender to their current gender is an essential
step in making these documents work for all the things we need them for, from buying
alcohol to entering federal buildings to riding on airplanes to applying for jobs.”).
195 See Paisley Currah, Defending Genders: Sex and Gender Non-Conformity in the
Civil Rights Strategies of Sexual Minorities, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1363, 1371 (1999)
(describing views on sex designation that have been labeled “common sense”).
196 See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Colli-
sion between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 267, 278–92 (1999) (explaining
that “the law typically has operated under the assumption that the terms ‘male’ and ‘fe-
male’ are fixed and unambiguous despite medical literature demonstrating that these as-
sumptions are not true”).
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Honor, then we’re headed for big trouble. . . .  It will create utter chaos.”197
As evidence of such chaos, opponents often predict that “men in dresses”
will begin preying on women in restrooms.198  Although observers need to
consider the United States’ unique cultural context, the manner in which the
situations in South Korea and similar jurisdictions play out will shed some
light on whether such doomsday predictions have any empirical support.
Many advocates of gender identity rights in South Korea see Family
Register as an important step forward for gender identity rights, but not as a
cure-all.199  Advocates in the United States are likely to share those senti-
ments.  Two criticisms of the case are particularly noteworthy.  First, the
decision over-relied on the medical model of transgenderism.200  The medical
model posits that a “true” transgender person, who deserves legal protec-
tion, identifies with certain psychological scripts (e.g., “I was born in the
wrong body”) and has desired or received medical treatment for that condi-
tion.201  This narrow definition of transgenderism excludes many transgender
persons from protection, including those who desire but cannot afford medi-
cal treatment.202  Second, by requiring transgender persons to perform cultur-
ally coded gender roles in order to prove that they have “successfully”
transitioned, the Family Register court reified objectionable, binary sex
stereotypes.203
197 Matt Bean, Lawyers Have Last Words in Transsexual Custody Battle, COURT TV
NEWS, Feb. 2, 2002, http://www.courttv.com/trials/kantaras/020802_ctv.html.
198 See PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK
FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 58–59 (2002), available at http://thetaskforce.org/
reports_and_research/trans_equality.
199 E-mail from Seung-hyun Lee, supra note 158.
200 Indeed, the majority suggested that the criteria they listed for changing one’s sex
designation derived from “medical studies.” See Family Register, 2004 Seu 42
§ 2(B)(2).
201 See Franklin H. Romeo, Note, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New
Conception of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713 (2005);
Spade, supra note 190.
202 Unlike Hong Kong, the Korean government does not subsidize sex-reassignment
surgery for those to whom it has been prescribed. See E-mail from Seung-hyun Lee,
supra note 158.
203 This requirement relates back to the medical model because medical doctors usu-
ally look to stereotypical gender-role performance as a measure of transgenderism. See
Spade, supra note 7, at 25–29.  For a discussion of how the Supreme Court has generally
treated sex stereotyping as objectionable, see Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the
Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (2000).
The Korean court suggested that its criteria for sex change recognition—including the
requirement that transsexuals first be socially recognized by the community for fulfilling
conventions associated with their current sex—derived from medical literature. See Fam-
ily Register, 2004 Seu 42 § 2(B)(2) (referencing “medical studies”).  Incidentally, the
Korean Supreme Court’s approach seems to comport with a more communitarian ap-
proach to rights, which is arguably more compatible with Confucian Korean culture, in-
stead of an approach grounded purely in individual autonomy.  The court essentially held
that individuals have the right to receive legal recognition of sex change; however, the
court situated that right within community conventions.  In a sense, the court was reacting
to community norms; it suggested that the community already recognizes certain
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Despite these criticisms, however, South Korea still comports more
with many of the United States’ peer jurisdictions than it does with the
United States.  Also, while Family Register is arguably under-protective of
gender identity rights, it is more protective than the legal situation in the
United States.  As such, the case should elicit attention from Americans,
inspiring us to question the “common sense” assumptions we make when
analyzing transgender issues.  Looking abroad would not be unprecedented;
a considerable number of cases concerning gender identity rights have al-
ready cited foreign law.204
CONCLUSION
Leung v. Secretary for Justice205 and In re Change of Name and Correc-
tion of Family Register,206 two recent court decisions from East Asia, offer
further evidence that a growing number of the United States’ peer jurisdic-
tions—both Western and Eastern—legally protect SOGI rights in ways that
surpass legal protections in the United States.  The fact that culturally diver-
gent jurisdictions have reached such overlapping judgments leads one to
think that protecting SOGI rights is not a culturally specific phenomenon,
but rather reflects an appropriate cross-cultural understanding of human
rights.
To the extent that the United States deviates from such prevailing views
on SOGI issues, that deviation should prompt Americans to think critically
about whether that deviation is justified or is simply a product of flawed
cultural biases that may be entrenched in legal reasoning.207  For example,
transsexuals for their current sex, so the law should, too.  This negotiation between the
community and the individual is reflected in other Korean Supreme Court cases. See,
e.g., Chaihark Hahm, Law, Culture, and the Politics of Confucianism, 16 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 253, 278-79 (2003) (using a Korean Supreme Court case (case no. 96Da52670)
on housing contracts between family members to illustrate how the community’s norms
can trump an individual’s rights—in this case, the right to enforce contracts).  On Con-
fucianism in Korea, see generally Hahm, supra note 138.
204 The courts have used foreign developments in various ways—sometimes choosing
to follow foreign jurisdictions, sometimes not; sometimes recognizing post-operative
transsexuals’ rights to legal recognition, sometimes not. See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (discussing case law from United Kingdom; legally
recognizing sex change); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999) (discussing
New Zealand and United Kingdom; not recognizing sex change); In re Estate of Gar-
diner, 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing the United Kingdom case law; not
recognizing sex change); In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68 (Md. 2003) (citing specific laws and
court decisions from Australia, the European Court of Human Rights, the United King-
dom, and a report on 20 European countries; recognizing sex change).
205 [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211 (C.A.); [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 657 (C.F.I.).
206 2004 Seu 42 (S. Kor. June 22, 2006), available at http://library.scourt.go.kr/jsp/
html/decision/2_67.2004seu42.htm.
207 Recall that cultural bias cannot sustain a law, even against rational basis review of
substantive due process and equal protection claims. See supra note 110 and accompany-
ing text; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (stating that enforcing
morality defined by majoritarian culture does not constitute a legitimate government in-
terest in substantive due process analysis); id. at 583–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stat-
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rational basis review for sexual orientation discrimination is less stringent
than the standards of review in Hong Kong and other peer jurisdictions.
Even though “rational basis with bite” requires courts to review sexual ori-
entation discrimination claims for illegitimate animus, developments abroad
prompt one to wonder whether the fact that sexual orientation claims only
receive rational basis review in the first place might, ironically, be a product
of cultural biases entrenched in the United States’ tiered approach to equal
protection.208
Aside from offering broad normative critiques, the two cases discussed
in this Article offer potential insights into specific empirical claims and the
usefulness of particular American legal tests.  For example, Family Register
paves the way for potential empirical evidence regarding the feasibility of
legally recognizing sex changes.  Meanwhile, Leung’s doctrinal formulation
can inform the development of a substitute to the oft-criticized tiered ap-
proach to equal protection claims in the United States.
In many regards, this Article is only the start to a larger conversation.
While this Article has shown how foreign developments should prompt criti-
cal self-reflection in the United States, that process of self-scrutiny needs to
be continued in subsequent scholarship.  Furthermore, this Article has
sought to broaden the American literature on comparative approaches to law
and sexuality beyond the confines of the West.  The cases of Leung and
Family Register highlight the insights that can be derived by a broader ap-
proach, but they are merely highlights.  This Article encourages scholars of
law and sexuality to continue being attentive to developments that occur
abroad in a range of cultural settings.
ing that moral disapproval does not constitute a legitimate government interest in equal
protection analysis); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996) (stating that cultur-
ally driven animus cannot form the legitimate government interest needed to sustain laws
against rational basis review in equal protection cases).
208 As noted above, foreign developments are not necessary to legitimize such inquir-
ies; however, foreign developments raise suspicions regarding the justifications offered
for certain American laws and legal doctrines, rendering such inquiries all the more
pressing.
